

International Workshop and Round Table on

**“Security Issues and Economic Cooperative Dimension in South Asia:
Towards a Regional Stability”**

Council Room, Municipality of Como, Italy, 27 September 2004

REPORT

Executive Summary

This International Workshop and Round Table organized by the Landau Network-Centro Volta (LNCV) with the support and under the auspices of the General Direction of Asia and Oceania of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs – and with the assistance and the collaboration of other national and international Organizations and Institutions listed in the enclosed program, in particular the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation – held in Como at the Council Room of the Municipality of Como, Italy, 27 September 2004, is the result of a lengthy process of analytical elaboration and the international cooperation that has existed between the LNCV and Indian and Pakistani experts since 1999.

LNCV’s essential aim in this meeting was to investigate the acceptance and the effectiveness, for the Asiatic nuclear sub-continent, of a comparatively new and pragmatic concept within the framework of international assistance programs for nuclear non-proliferation, known as “Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)”. At the same time, the status of the security environment in South Asia since the nuclear tests of May 1998 was analysed.

CTR, also known as the “Nunn-Lugar initiative”, was started as a bilateral US-Russia program in November 1991 in order to prevent the potential spread of nuclear weapons, materials, equipment and knowledge following the dissolution of the former Soviet Union (FSU) and to help Russia in downsizing and consolidating the FSU’s vast nuclear weapons complex (NWC) inheritance.

The main results of the Workshop are the following:

- India and Pakistan, both Nuclear Weapons States (NWSs) *outside* the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – from now on, referred to as ONWS – are a further example of the

soundness of some concepts of the “Rational Nuclear Deterrence (RND) theory”. This holds that, once the “nuclear threshold” has been crossed, it is difficult for the new NWS to attain “strategic stability” – inter alia strategic parity – in terms of a *minimal*, credible, survivable nuclear deterrent”. In particular, in the case of “security environments” such as that of the Asian sub-continent, characterized by “perceived threats”, “unsolved conflicts” (here the “Kashmir question”) and “strategic asymmetry (in terms of conventional forces)”, it is very difficult to define “small deterrent nuclear forces”, that is their number, and the “underlying nuclear doctrines (i.e. transparency, first or no-first use, triggering conditions, etc.)”. The classical RND theory states that in a nuclear logic, the strategic plateau is determined by the concepts of “unacceptable damage” and “second strike capability”, the latter in order to dissuade another state from attacking first. However, in the case of India and Pakistan, the RND is *inherently unstable* due to unconventional factors, such as the political environment, the effect of non-state actors, the asymmetric conventional arms race, the perceived threats, etc. Consequently, some participants of the Workshop have stated that the nuclear forces and related assets (such as fissile nuclear materials) are growing “daily” in order to reach a theoretically forecasted strategic stability as quickly as possible.

- The ONWS India and Pakistan both consider themselves “rational states” and “regional powers” which have achieved a kind of “natural right” (“*id quod semper aequum et bonum est*”) to become NWSs owing to the “very discriminatory” nature of the global non-proliferation regime – the idea of NPT itself is an Indian idea. Even if in the middle of the Cold War, beginning with the 70’s (the first Indian test was in 1974) the reasons for becoming NWSs could have been different and more complex for India and Pakistan, today – roughly fifteen years after the end of Cold War – the position reflected in the Workshop by participants who have had governmental assignments is almost unanimous: the two countries are “de facto” nuclear in the same way as the NPT P5 (the US, Russia, China, France and UK). Some key speakers suggested a possible explanation of the nuclear choices made by the two states: this draws upon historical cognitive belief structures and ideological formations present in both societies. Since the next NPT Review Conference in May 2005 will re-think article IV of the NPT – on the inalienable rights of member states to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including the relevant equipment, for instance for the domestic

production of nuclear fuel – and article X – on the right of each Party to withdraw from the Treaty in exercising its national sovereignty – another speaker suggested reconsidering the Treaty’s membership conditions, article IX, which states that an NWS is one which had manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.

- It is therefore obvious from the previous “items” that the present “South Asia nuclear security environment” is very different from that of Russia in the early 90’s. In general, Indian and Pakistani experts actually agree on the following points: i) there is no risk that a conflict may start “a priori” with a nuclear mushroom. This does not obviously exclude the dangers inherent in mere possession and development of nuclear weapons and related equipment, even in the absence of a deliberate nuclear conflict due to unauthorized, accidental nuclear launches; ii) the Indian and Pakistani nuclear forces are regional deterrents which do not threaten the West; iii) some Indian and Pakistani experts have argued that, even in the 1999 Kargil crisis, there was never the risk that such conventional warfare would turn into a nuclear exchange. Others, however, have reported that during the conflict all communications broke down and only the hot-line between the army chiefs continued to operate, and that with serious difficulty (in a 10 minute call it broke down three times). Furthermore, the dogma on the rational nature of the two South Asia ONWS and on the RND, should prevent potential future local wars from escalating into nuclear conflicts (also, according to this dogma, conventional wars themselves could not escalate to the maximum without the risk of triggering nuclear exchanges as a last resort); iv) the risks of nuclear terrorism, for instance the theft of nuclear weapons and materials, is almost excluded by the argument that India and Pakistan are like the other NWSs, therefore underpinning their same “practices” such as the ability to defend their nuclear weapons assets. Again we are in the presence of a cultural factor, since in multi-ethnic societies with severe inequalities and in countries with strong militant religious factions, some form of terrorism/religious fundamentalism is considered endemic and inevitable in a certain sense. Hence it is not raised to the level of a rational threat challenging the state assets, as it is believed in the West – the fear, intensity and type does not have a universal value for all human beings.
- Almost all participants in the Workshop underlined that the “dangers” are related more to the mere possession and deployment of nuclear weapons in the particular security

environment of the Asiatic sub-continent¹ than to non-proliferation problems². As a consequence of this perception, it follows that the usual Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) practices of the US-Russia Nunn-Lugar model have been considered quite ineffective and not useful for South Asia unless they focus on specific, non-sensitive tools. Indeed, Indians and Pakistanis preferred to replace the classical concept of CTR with the fairly ambiguous and broader concept of “Risk Reduction (RR)” of the nuclear dangers in South Asia.

- In other words, for many Indian and Pakistani experts, an effective RR approach in the Asiatic sub-continent is linked more to *arms control* practices than to non-proliferation tools. Therefore, India and Pakistan demand that the West help them avoid an accidental nuclear exchange in the region by assistance programs in the following RR fields: i) to improve the command-control-communication-computer-information (C⁴ I) systems; ii) to implement mutually acceptable verification systems of capping and de-alerting the nuclear arsenals; iii) to increase survival, rather than build more nukes; iv) to upgrade early warning systems specific to South Asia in order to reduce the risk of early responses to tactical early warning; etc. Of course, the NPT NWS can offer none of these RR to India and Pakistan because of the legal provisions of the NPT and the fact that such technological assistance could enhance the nuclear deterrence of the two ONWSs with the final outcome of stimulating permanent deployment of the nuclear weapons by India or Pakistan or both. It is clear that nuclearized South Asia requires some sort of *ad-hoc* “Multilateral Regional Security Conference”, enlarged to include at least the NPT P5, in order to address the security concerns and to reduce the nuclear dangers of the region. It is not clear how this arrangement could be linked to the NPT, or whether it might, at a later stage, facilitate a nuclear rolling-back by India and Pakistan.
- Participants also agreed that the softer and less sensitive tools of the classical CTR model are still plausible in South Asia if the West adopts *separate non-confrontational* approaches for India and Pakistan. In other words, both Confidence Security Building Measures (CSBMs) and CTR efforts must distinguish between India and Pakistan, since

¹ Note also the fact that the very short flight of a strategic ballistic missile between the two countries, (about 5 minutes), makes the option of keeping all systems on de-alert and de-mated entirely unrealistic in times of crisis.

² In this context, the “Abdul Khan affair” has been regarded merely as a moment in the nuclear development of Pakistan and no longer to be taken into great account, since it is assumed that the Pakistani government has now stemmed its related nuclear proliferation activities.

nobody in the Indian and Pakistani governments would endorse CSBMs & CTR approaches which bracket India and Pakistan together. A minimal list of these separate soft CTR tools involves: i) improving safeguards, physical control of and accountability for (if and as appropriate) items of concern; ii) countering, by suitable technologies and methodologies, the leakage of nuclear materials, technologies and equipment to unauthorized actors; iii) improving rational export controls to prevent illicit trafficking of items of concern; iv) increasing the domestic security and safeguards culture by dedicated training and specific audits with western governmental and NGO experts; v) facilitating the creation of a robust “South Asian Working Group” of independent non-governmental nuclear and missile non-proliferation and disarmament experts in the region, as well as the creation of suitable “risk reduction centres” in both countries; vi) information sharing in the fields of civilian nuclear technology and nuclear experts re-direction.

- Last, but not least, it is pivotal in the current India-Pakistan negotiations to re-activate the 1999 Lahore dialogue and to implement its MOU; this effort could mark the beginning of a long-term Helsinki-like process for South Asia in our post Cold War age. As one participant said, “if all we have to offer as NGOs is problem-solving for governments, then we just become adjuncts to the governments which are the problem”.

Prepared by Maurizio Martellini, LNCV, Como, Italy, on 22 November 2004.

*Minutes**

Session 1. Security environment and Strategic Stability

M. Afzal (Pakistan)

Nuclear Safety and Security

India and Pakistan capable of defending nuclear assets

Looks at 4 types of threat

Outsider: every government can defend its own nuclear facilities

Change in government by coups

Can't rule them out

Military governments have always been pro-western

Pakistan military trained in western traditions and highly disciplined

Religious influence in military is minimal

Probability that government hostile to west could take over is very small

Government taking steps to reduce influence of religious extremists

CTR in South Asia?

Yes, but...in modified form; Soviet Union and South Asia situations are different

No loose nukes or material or scientists looking for outside jobs

Both countries in process of consolidating nuclear regime: increasing capability, safety and security

Present status

Some talks between the US and South Asia

Training of security personnel might be going on

Reservations and sensitivities

US;

US laws and regulations, and political considerations: do not want to help de facto nuclear states

South Asia;

National pride

Secrecy and confidentiality

Ambiguity concerning actual status: benefits of ambiguity

How to overcome these

Direct involvement of key personnel from both sides

Involve non-official entities (NGOs, think tanks)

Non-official track could prepare proposals

From physical protection, to personnel, security of nuclear materials, finally to nuclear weapons

* Prepared by Maurizio Martellini and James Walsh

Formulate models, put on table, and let governments see what they can pursue
Each national government could then pursue on own

First and foremost

Some in west want rollback—not practical (not saying never, but not for long time)
Sole objective to enhance security and safety
Non-confrontational
Should integrate South Asia in global community, not leave it isolated
Serious dialogue on global disarmament by P5 to deal with nonproliferation community and disarmament

D. Banerjee (India)

Strategic context

Complex and unfavorable
International terrorism did not begin with 9/11
Did focus international attention on dangers
Methods of combat and attention has worsened the strategic environment
South Asia: a more volatile region
Talk of value/relevance of nuclear weapons: not so now
Spreading knowledge of nuclear weapons
Media and nonproliferation community focused on South Asia

Current state of India-Pakistan relations and problem of progress

More positive than at any time in recent past
Opportunities for making improvements in their societies
Window of opportunity for constructive dialogue
Still the process has gone forward
Time of positive engagement where issues can be addressed
Burden on civil society/Track II to look at all possibilities
Sustained Track II leading to well structured outcomes
Many Track II's in recent years
Dialogue has to be sustained and constant engagement
Don't expect substantive solutions from Track II's
Provides way to address complex issues with fresh minds
Opportunity to generate new ideas that can be picked up by governments

Priorities

No nuclear accidents of any nature
Need for nuclear risk reduction; e.g., doctrinal transparency
A lot of Track II work on this but not Track I
Jammu and Kashmir engagement dialogue
Positive people to people economic interactions

N. Salik (Pakistan)

Positive signs from South Asia

First cycle of dialogue has been completed (several rounds of talks – from June 2004, talks for experts, then for ministries, then for leaders)

Between September 2004 and January 2005 there will be another cycle of talks

So far, contrary to cynics, the fact that both sides are determined to turn process into sustained process is an achievement

Should not expect miracles, need patience (given difficulty of issues and history of animosity)

Expert talks very successful: some agreements and some in principle, but diplomats will make it take a while

Need for strategic stability

Any conflict will have far reaching impact

Both countries have to be careful that they can achieve security at a minimum level

If they do not stop and there is no peace dividend, then they shall have both conventional and nuclear arms race

Talks of BMD in India (current government not so enthusiastic): destabilizing factor

Have to think about conventional CSBMs for South Asia

Both have to work to reduce nuclear accidents and unauthorized use

Both countries have taken action but have not made this public so the other country doesn't know about it

Need for transparency (doctrinal transparency)

Communications

During the crisis all communications broke down

Only the hotline was still in place at that time and even that had problems: lots of noise; in a 10 minute call it broke down three times; only voice channel: it can make problems worse

Better to have secure text line, probably fiber optic + Internet supplement

Direct lines between them for security

Pave the way for nuclear risk reduction centers in India and Pakistan

Regional arrangements

Whole SAARC region has suffered compared to ASEAN

Once economic cooperation is established, it will take root and be a constituent for progress

Energy cooperation very important, e.g., by gas pipelines

M.V. Ramana (India) and Z. Mian (Pakistan)

Security situation

Today the situation is far more favorable than in the recent past, however the current situation is very fragile and could change very fast

Cannot take it for granted; have to keep pressing for more achievements

If situation changes and war breaks out, it could be quite deadly

There exist ongoing arms races

Adoption of more aggressive doctrines, e.g., talk of hot pursuit, escalation dominance, etc.

The 2001-2002 crisis was very dangerous: seen as victory by both sides.
For India: Pakistan has cracked down on terrorists; for Pakistan: its nuclear weapons stopped India from attacking. In all crises, there has been nuclear brinkmanship
Both countries have played a dangerous game of chicken.

If nuclear weapons are deployed they will make any crisis more dangerous

Recommendations

Need to curtail arms sales

Giving arms capability as part of CTR measures is not advisable

Giving PALs will facilitate the deployment of nuclear weapons

Instead of PALs, it would be better to keep nuclear warheads dismantled

Z. Mian (Pakistan)

Responding to Afzal

Pakistan military was pro-western out of necessity, not the result of tradition or an inherent liking for the west

It was for guns and money and legitimacy, not commitment to the west or democracy

Strategic environment

Profound impact of US policy on strategic stability

The extension of NPT and CTBT brought to the tests in '98

What else might the US do in the future that has an impact: e.g., new US position on FMTC; US presidential elections; US nuclear tests – perhaps as soon as 2007

Making weapons talking peace

In Pakistan, however: frequent missile tests; no mention of reduction of production of fissile material; national consensus for nuclear weapons

CTR for South Asia

Any approach to risk reduction has have to grapple with nuclear race momentum

Not much cooperativeness in the region

Funny notion of threat as well

CTR in Russia: now that Russia backs it, Russia still has weapons

Where does CTR get you in the end?

Does it get you any more that US-Soviet arms control?

India and Pakistan - new engagement

They have had these periods of engagement before

Historically not clear what has helped in the end

US role has led to larger Pakistan army, larger than it could sustain

US-India strategic partnership: how does it affect Indian military and civil relations?

Can see impact of US on Pakistan strategic thinking: growing interest in high tech weapons and domestic drift to Islamic parties

Session 2. Multilateral Regional Security Arrangements

B. Chellaney (India)

Terrorism

Terrorism spreading, increasingly linked with Islamic fundamentalism

India has larger Muslim population than Pakistan, 2nd largest Muslim population in world

Why are Indian Muslims moderate? Why no Indian Al Qaeda?

Indian Muslims participate in democracy, have outlets for expression

Democracy is a modernizing force

Terrorism springs from religious bigotry and rejection of democracy

Elections by themselves do not signal success in the war against terrorism

Democracy as free choice not imposed from outside, need for indigenous democratic ethos

P. Ghosh (India)

Maritime CBMs

Hard to explain maritime CBMs to those with continental mindsets

Can help in overall picture

Overwhelming emphasis on nuclear CBMs

Nuclear conflict can be triggered by any small incident – from any *casus belli* including maritime incident

Maritime area the best environment for CBMs:

Why more conducive:

Adversarial level between Pakistan and Indian navy to date is much lower

Ties between the navies inherently easier [more shared culture]

This has been mentioned in summits but not received the attention it deserves

What are the issues?

Theater and situational commanders should be able to talk to each other

No time for issue to go back to governments for instructions

Need dedicated channels

Need exchange between navy officers

Non-military exchanges are also welcomed (e.g., problem of fishermen)

Joint participation in peacekeeping operations

Cooperation on arms and drug smuggling

P. Hoodboy (Pakistan)

Security environment (Pakistan)

Regardless of who is in office -- Musharraf pre-9/11 or Musharraf post 9/11 – certain fixed points:

Production of fissile material and nuclear weapons will continue at maximum rate possible

Missile tests: not much difference between a test with a frown and a test with a smile

Development of new missiles, MIRVing

Use of space for reconnaissance and BMD (particularly by India)

Do not anticipate nuclear testing

Analogy of nuclear “assets” with heroin; both producers and buyers want more

CBMs industry

Have 72, could add another 72 – a nice thing: but it doesn’t alter the fact that development of nuclear weapons has started down a path and will continue at maximum rate possible

Still, not everything substantial has been established

Only speaking of India and Pakistan principles

Issue of safety and security of nuclear weapons is a political issue

Sharing of nuclear is a political issue: in Pakistan Khan network was not an individual effort – those at the top knew; how could he have moved entire centrifuges?

Relations to Islamic groups will be a political issue

Transparency (US #1 agenda) of Pakistan nuclear assets is a political issue

Government will determine how far CBMs go

Pakistan political facts

If Musharraf were to be assassinated, this would not represent a problem in the short term (for up to a year) since Pakistan is run by the military; what happens in long run – don’t know

Military holds government together; it has separatist movements; it doesn’t have imagination or ability to make changes in society in the long run

Lack of economic opportunity; expanding birthrate; massive urbanization; lack of education

Pakistan military is not pro-western; it has its own characteristics which have been becoming more pronounced since Haq; recruitment now based on defending Islam

Musharraf at one end of the spectrum; lower levels have different way of thinking; higher generals get everything they want; most countries have armies, in the case of Pakistan, the army has a country

Within 5 years, in fair and free elections, Islamic parties could come to power; US actions led to Islamic political gains; army intrinsically Islamic, so could form coalition or could have Islamization of military like under the Haq presidency

Minister of education is an ISI general; education has to be revived; youth is de-politicized: in its place, sectarian and ethnic affiliations

R. Menon (India)

Security environment

Things can go wrong and better to be prepared; India-Pakistan

1st session of talks as an attempt to stop things from going wrong

The key question is how to manage the South Asia nuclear arsenals, assuming that the peaceful trend cannot be maintained. If both the nuclear players are status quo powers, it shouldn't be a problem: if one is not, then there will be problems

Best model is central Europe

Europe: possibility of land conflict going to nuclear threshold, i.e. 40 years of hostility in nuclear environment

South Asia: 50 years of hostility, 6 in nuclear environment

South Asia compared with the EU has some main differences: ballistic missiles fly shorter, permanent alert status and defcon 2 when there exists firing (i.e. continuously)

South Asia nuclear strategy: terminology is the same; increase in range and accuracy in 6 years; improved weapons yields; improved hardening, etc, over past 6 years, have moved in same ways that west did; however, no support for "Asian way" in nuclear field

Six lessons for experts:

1. Nuclear stability is more difficult to achieve than imagined in '98
2. Nuclear technology has an influence on C³I
3. Nuclear doctrine will not remain static: it is influenced by technology
4. Transparency on doctrine: it is also influenced by technology
5. Beginning of arms race: no "starter gun"
6. Only known way to add stability is "to cap arsenal"

Risk reductions through 4 stages:

1. Transparency in doctrine
2. CBM risk reduction
3. Arms control negotiations
4. CTR and mutual risk reductions centers

Not possible to short cut these 4 stages: CTR only if we have capping agreements; no capping agreements unless we have arms control; no arms control without confidence

History of arms control practices

SALT I process (shortest of arms control agreements) took 2 years of negotiations; so far India and Pakistan have taken 2 days: when they say they have "started the process" that is a very limited achievement

T. Masood (Pakistan)

Security environment

Thinks current state is more encouraging than past examples

External conditions have forced India and Pakistan to arrive at this point

Realization that confrontation has not worked

What are the reasons?

1. May 98: false sense of euphoria; thought had more latitude than they had; thought their status on world stage has been raised
2. Kargil: shook Pakistan; in nuclear environment it is not possible to go into conflict; it was realized that it was a mistake; Indian mobilization for 10 months; seen as a mistake

International environment is extremely favorable: all outside actors want progress in South Asian relations

The main challenge is to anchor dialogue to a more stable framework: need for more sustained progress

Recommendations

Conflict management is extremely important

It is important that Pakistan moves to ceasefire and India reciprocates

Pakistan has taken sincere measures on insurgency: it is very important that it continues to do so

India should reciprocate, improving human rights in Kashmir

Need to reduce conventional forces in South Asia

Conflict resolution

Kashmir is complex but has to be resolved for stability

No common approach on methodology for talks on Kashmir

Kashmir CBMs have to be given high priority

Allow people and businesses to interact and become constituencies for peace

Religious parties in Pakistan have been supportive of the peace process and need to be brought into the process

Hard CBMs as risk reduction measures

Pullback of artillery and mortars

No deployment zones

Reciprocal verification measures

Reduction of conventional forces

Cap increases in defence budgets

Nuclear issue

Doctrine and development have gained pace

Indian nuclear development will be affected by China, Pakistan, economic matters and US policy

Pakistan doctrine will be influenced by Indian doctrine

Pakistan needs more transparency while maintaining some level of ambiguity/secretcy

Problem of misunderstanding

Need for further definition of red lines, ambiguity with respect to responses, but need clarity on where the red lines are

Nuclear CBMs

Need better safety and security for nuclear arsenals

Perhaps India and Pakistan could carry out a joint exercise on nuclear accidents

Information sharing on nuclear safety/security between India and Pakistan

They should continue with the test moratorium, making it a legal doctrine

Loose nuclear rhetoric has to be discouraged

Need for a balance between conventional and nuclear force: indeed, if India increases its conventional forces (quality and quantity), Pakistan will rely more on nukes

A. Nayyar (Pakistan)

Security environment

Not track 2 – track 3 or 4: thaw in India-Pakistan relations

Pakistan taking steps against jihadists: it claims to have stopped all; India says no and increases border fences

Misgivings and fears, climate of suspicion and mistrust

Defense budgets have increased massively; budgets have supported the arms race

Indian purchases for early warning lead Pakistan to see its deterrent as being undermined

Low threshold of Pakistan use has led India to consider alternatives, such as the so-called “cold start” – intervention before things gets going

No end in sight to military build up

In response to Indian posture of “no first use”, Pakistan offered a “no war agreement”

Concept not new; Musharaf offered the no war pact again at millennium summit

What are Pakistan’s fears?:

1. Large incursion into Pakistan territory
2. Naval blockade
3. Water to Pakistan rivers being cut off despite Indus water treaty

What are India’s fears?

1. Much of defence preparedness focused on Pakistan
2. Fear of proxy war

Pakistan and India take advantage of reciprocal instabilities and soft points: can these fears be allayed in some manner?

Time to revisit the no war pact concept in a form that could address these fears

The revised no war conditions pact should define what an act of war or hostile act would be, taking into account each side’s fears

1. Use of armaments
2. Abetting hostile actions by insurrectionary groups
3. Helping with acts of sabotage
4. Incursion into the other's territory
5. Blocking sea and harbour access
6. Blocking rivers or water

Advantages of such a "conditions pact" on defining act of war:

1. Fears and misgivings would diminish
2. Help stop arms race
3. Reduce need for nuclear weapons
4. Could trigger other agreements between them and with other South Asian countries

Furthermore, one should have an external (UN?) adjudication commission for disputes between India and Pakistan

R. Rajaraman (India)

About CTR for South Asia

Many "soft" CTR worked successfully in the Cold War; other CTR tools, such as auditing and ensuring fissile material security, worked less successfully

However, the US-SU CTR initiative, alias the Nunn-Lugar program, has been sufficiently successful to think of its geographic extension beyond NIS/Russia; I will consider a possible CTR approach to India

Direct copying from FSU context is not possible because of obvious differences; the breakup of the FSU brings severe economic problems to Russia, and the huge nuclear archipelago inheritance of the FSU leads US to help

India is a different case: it is stable and economically solid and growing; therefore it is not looking for handout funds; furthermore the Indian nuclear arsenal is comparatively smaller

From a US view, the Indian nukes are not a threat to the US; furthermore the proliferation risks are small compared to other situations

But there are plenty of nuclear threats:

1. Conventional wars turning nuclear
2. Dangers from possession of nukes: fire, accidents, unauthorized use, false alarms, early warning miscalculations, false alarms and massive urban panic
3. Theft by non-state actors

World is worried by 3, but India and Pakistan are worried by 1 and 2

Suggested nuclear CTR measures in South Asia:

1. Capping nuclear warheads; a few dozen of nukes in nuclear doctrine constitute unacceptable damage; therefore an effective risk reduction measure is to cap the nuclear deterrents at the current levels;

2. Corresponding cut-off on Pu production and research reactors
3. Keep all systems on de-alert and de-mated
4. Have de-alert now, through a declaratory policy by both India and Pakistan
5. Mutually acceptable verification of capping and de-alert
6. Not have early response to tactical early warning including BMD
7. Improve survivability, rather than build more nukes

The international community can help with: consulted, not condescending or coercive CTR measures, regarding India and Pakistan as equal partners

Need for a robust non-government community of technical experts to implement an effective CTR process in South Asia

M. Afzal (Pakistan)

Soft CTR

Accounting of non-fissile nuclear materials as CTR issue

What is of interest here requires the control of: i) radiation sources; ii) gamma sources in nuclear establishments and for industrial radiography and sterilization; iii) radio-isotopes in medicine and agriculture

PNRA (Pakistan Nuclear Regulation Agency) regulates radiological sources from the point of view of public health. There is need for an Agency for the management, accounting, disposal and regulating of RAD sources independent from any nuclear agencies

There should be an exchange of information on this aspect with both the west and India to reduce the risks of illicit trafficking and RAD terrorism

I. Anthony (EU)

Euro programs on CTR

Pre-'02 very little activity with little money; Post-'02 notable expansion of the program and of the budget, with new program areas in the environmental and nuclear safety issues

Background EU processes driving towards: i) EU security strategy; ii) EU strategy against WMD; iii) EU action plan

Factors driving changes: i) EU wants to be global actor; ii) efforts to respond to specific external threats; iii) efforts to repair transatlantic relations after Iraq war; iv) efforts also to repair intra-EU relations

EU is a member of the G8 Global Partnership, in the FSU (main focus), in International organizations (IAEA, OPCW, WHO)

CTR expansion

A) "Functional expansion" for:

- i) Pathogen safety and security
- ii) Export control assistance
- iii) Border security and management

B) “Geographic expansion” to non –FSU areas (like South Asia) is of low priority for the EU

Budget costs

Currently a few million Euros per year, but a large increase is expected with the next budget cycle, in 2007.

M. Martellini (EU)

Political implementation of CTR practices by the EU

In the past, e.g. EU – Ukraine relations, i.e. to require them to join NPT in exchange for economic rewards

Now, EU has a “nonproliferation clause” in its security strategy which is going to represent a larger share in EU bilateral relations; the nonproliferation clause is now applied with respect to Syria and Iran

EU has pushed on the Iranian side and Iran has pushed back, let’s see the outcome

K. Luongo (US)

CTR approaches

Growing interest in expansion of CTR: hatched in Congress and there is no interest in the executive branch, but there is in NGOs

More questions than answers but need to think about questions over next 18-24 months

Traditional (classical) CTR programs, mostly for Russia/FSU-US dialogue:

- i) elimination of launchers from START I was the main accomplishment
- ii) some success with fissile materials
- iii) links to disarmament activities

Scope of CTR has expanded tremendously; it has many features

Mistake to focus CTR just on hard or technical aspects

CTR concept has to be broad enough to include more than just the disarmament issue

What has CTR expansion meant over past 8 years?

- i) It had to start with security challenges on the ground, since every place has unique security challenges
- ii) The most important thing is that people want to work together
- iii) No agreement compelling actors
- iv) Need to look at full range and gradations

The US has undergone 4 CTR expansion cases in the past:

- 1) Expansion to China in mid-1990s for fissile material and verification of the test ban. It collapsed with Wen Ho Lee affairs. However, this year, the US has signed a new agreement with China on fissile material involving lab-to-lab collaboration
- 2) Libya and Iraq for the re-employment of former WMD scientists in the case of Iraq, and for the removal of sensitive material mainly in the case of Libya.
- 3) Securing spent nuclear fuel and decommissioning of nuclear research reactors
- 4) Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) and a US-RF Agreement to receive US financial and technical assistance to ship world-wide fresh and spent research reactor fuel (i.e. HEU) to Russia for safe and secure management

[GTRI offers new measures for working on an international basis, to identify, secure, remove and/or facilitate the disposition of vulnerable nuclear and other radiological materials and equipment around the world, as quickly and expeditiously as possible]

The last G8 summit rejected the idea of expanding beyond Russia to FSU States and non-FSU States (like South Asia nations)

State that are not members of NPT, not recognized for CTR assistance

Conflict between the threat reducers and arsenal eliminators

CTR can be a bridge between US and any other state eligible for CTR assistance, as was true in the case of Russia

One should include Russian and Chinese end users to talk about their CTR experience, and to use Russia and China as “mediators” for CTR approaches towards third party states

Problems for CTR expansion:

- i) funds (the US has not provided 1 new penny for Libya and Iraq for CTR and for GTRI)
- ii) Legal: NPT, US domestic law
- iii) Domestic constituencies (US Congress support is very limited)

V. Patney (India)

Security situation

Importance of economy; peace and security in South Asia linked to economic development; have to match other initiatives with economic development; the economy in South Asia must be enhanced because not good, but not bad; mistrust is temporary until economic development achieved

No real serious risk of war; not likely to happen

India's perspectives

India looks to an eastward policy; in this context road-rail communications with China can help.

Kashmir is a very difficult issue; who are the Kashmiri people? How can they be given the choice of what to do? One cannot impose a solution; how can one accept a solution with mistrust? Only with economic development

The Jama at-I-Islami faction of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) in the Valley (chief Syed Ali Shah Geelami), funded by Pakistan, is still willing to meet with Pakistan, but this wouldn't be permitted in Pakistan

India can only reduce troops if the reason for troops is eliminated, but how can India be sure that the problem won't recur after withdrawal? Indeed, there are no Pakistani casualties on the Pakistani side of border and yet we have Indian casualties on the Indian side

One could make Indian nuclear doctrine more transparent (and credible)

Concerns by international community with respect to South Asia's safety and security

Any accident would cause democratic government to fall in India; therefore the key point is how to prevent it; concerning the size of the Indian nuclear arsenal - it must be small: 60 estimated nukes too high a number for India

Pakistan as a key proliferating State

The Khan affair clearly enjoyed the complicity of many on the governmental side who said nothing

Regarding nuclear war

The use of nuclear weapons is unlikely; India and Pakistan are all rational actors; both countries had developed weapons well before 1998

The international community cannot treat India and Pakistan as pariah states; trust will beget trust

Regarding terrorism

One cannot have failed states; therefore one needs less money to be spent on fighting terrorism and more on economic development

Pakistan should focus on economic development

People to people contact is the key factor; the border traffic has increased 4 fold recently

Natural gas cooperation between the two countries (by pipeline transit) is fundamental; economic cooperation with Afghanistan is also very important

General Discussion

N. Salik (Pakistan)

Yes, there is a relationship between nuclear and conventional arms control and risks reduction

NPT: there is talk of eliminating articles IV and X; if one can change these articles, why can't one change membership rules?

Nuclear fuel cycle: an international monopoly will not work

CTR: facing a lot of problems now (funding, concepts, etc)
Expanding CTR without due deliberation is a mistake; the expansion has to be nondiscriminatory

Response to Patney:

India should give Kashmir the right to self-determination; cross-border fire might be monitored by an international force along the LOC; if India is boosting its defence budget, Pakistan has to follow suit; economic cooperation on Afghanistan is possible

P. Ghosh (India)

Threat reduction and relation to security dimensions: at a first sight there exists a link, but the issue is much more complex

Threat reduction is tied to threat perception, and hence the reduction of the threat may not result in inventory cuts

No war pact: I support the idea, lovely idea, but how does it really happen?

Nuclear weapons are political weapons; in small nuclear forces, the deterrence value does not change if one changes inventories within a certain range or band

T. Masood (Pakistan)

Arms control and threat reduction are linked

Arms control will only come about when there is political willingness, therefore one should support the development of political willingness

India and Pakistan have an asymmetrical relationship: one can make reductions that don't disturb the balance

Nuclear weapons are political weapons, but when one over-emphasizes their roles for hegemonic purposes, one ends with problems

Safety and security issues affected by size, but still one can have small nuclear arsenals with problems

Economy problems in South Asia are not the main concern: one has to address the right problems at the right time

A. Pikayev (Russia)

FSU/Russia experience shows little link between arms control and risk reduction: at the beginning yes, but then ABM Treaty and Moscow party. This link survived ups and downs in bilateral relations between the US and the FSU/Russia.

For Russia there is no CTR, but just global partnership (as a heritage of past strategy parity)

Less feeling of external pressures as the Russian economy has improved

Security problems cannot be solved overnight or in one way

The west says go non-nuclear and get the benefits of nuclear assistance: we have had little
So the right question is always what are the “carrots” and the “sticks”. Let us propose a clear, unambiguous carrots and sticks diplomacy for Pakistan and India

R. Menon (India)

Is there a link between arms control and threat reduction? American academic floated the idea. Response: what do we get in return?

The public outrage is that NPT was an Indian idea, but then India ended up outside NPT; even the US is saying this does not matter, the US will give India technology, and this pledge doesn't translate on the ground

It is difficult to sell the idea of threat reduction measures if one can't come up with some other forum where India and Pakistan meet the US and the UN, and where specific arms control measures, say the elimination of short range ballistic missiles, are countered by specific offers by the US and the UN. Furthermore, who is going to run such an initiative: the US, selected member of the UN system? India's opposition would only accept the UN

D. Banerjee (India)

Agree with Pakistani friends on the need to address conventional forces, still an issue of when and how, but it must be addressed. The Helsinki process started long before its implementation

The NPT Review Conference is an intensely political process; unlikely to get any positive outcome at review meeting; the structure of NPT has outlived itself

Expanded cooperative threat reduction (Expanded CTR):

i) it must be region specific

ii) its agenda has to be reformed perhaps in a new process of dialogue

M. Afzal (Pakistan)

NPT is problematic:

i) discriminatory

ii) with no full commitment to Article 6

iii) with no progress for a Middle East NWFZ; its indefinite extension has made it more fragile; CTB is halted; banning the domestic nuclear fuel cycle to the NNWS, will make it more discriminatory; however all efforts should be made to preserve NPT

NPT countries unlikely will give concessions to India and Pakistan;

If one lumps Israel with India-Pakistan, it is likely to have more dropouts

Maurizio's proposal (i.e. an internationalized legally-binding CTR regime to account also non-NPT States), could be useful – doing something without rocking NPT boat; for this purpose I'd not use the phrase "risk reduction" - not risk from India and Pakistan – but instead make use of "safety and security" cooperative efforts

Z. Mian (Pakistan)

It is very disappointing to realize how limited our ambitions have become: 40 years after invention of arms control, the best that we have to offer is the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (the Moscow Treaty), a not very encouraging picture

Suppose we succeed with CTR, so what? What will we have? We shall get robust WMD organizations in place and threats displaced into the indefinite future

The ultimate threat is the political value to the nuclear deterrent: having nuclear weapons and big armies is not a solution at all; even peace movements have been hollowed out

The technical arms control disembodied from civil society always looks for legitimacy from governments; if all we have to offer governments is "problem solving", then we just become adjunct to the governments which are the problem

B. Chellaney (India)

NPT is in crisis because of South Korea, Brazil and the Israel issue

In the past year alone, different models (6 party talks, Libya model, FSU/Russia model, etc.) have been proposed to address the cases of North Korea, Iran, etc. However these models have to be mutually consistent

The PSI is a muscle flexing exercise